TABLE OF CONTENTS

- Introduction

PART-I

Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes

Universal Jurisdiction

PART-II

Torture: Extradite or Prosecute

Universal Jurisdiction

PART-III

Immunity

Amnesty

PART-IV

Conclusion

INTRODUCTION :

National prosecutions are not only the primary vehicle for the enforcement of international crimes, they are also often considered a preferable option – in political, sociological, practical, and legitimacy terms – to international prosecutions. National prosecutions of international crimes have been highly selective and, generally, States have been unwilling to prosecute their own nationals. The international criminal jurisdictions are an answer to the impunity that generally exists domestically. There are many problems which the domestic courts face when it comes to prosecution of international crimes. Universal jurisdiction, amnesty, immunity (political offence exception), statutory limitation, insufficient legislation, evidence in a criminal case is located in a foreign jurisdiction, witnesses are outside the jurisdiction and are unwilling or unable to return (or is prohibitively expensive for the prosecution to bring them back for the trial), extradition, international co-operation, ne bis in idem i.e. double jeopardy, double criminality rule as in England etc are some of the problems which the national courts face. Many international crimes are inadequately defined, leaving domestic courts leeway to fill in details, and it is rarely clear which procedure rules apply – those pertaining in the trial state or those of the state where the crimes was committed – also remains a contested issue.

In Part I of the essay we will discuss domestic prosecutions of international crimes and universal jurisdiction. To appreciate fully the extradite or prosecute principle; we will have an overview of torture: extradite or prosecute principle (aut dedere aut judicare) and universal jurisdiction in Part II. Further, in Part III the discussion will focus on the success and problems faced by domestic courts for prosecution of international crimes with special reference to immunities and amnesties taking into consideration the recent decision of the ICJ. Part IV demonstrates the duty of States to prosecute international crimes in light of ICC Statute.

PART-I

DOMESTIC PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION :

On 23 December 2005, the District Court of The Hague delivered its judgment in the van Anraat case. During the 1980s, the Dutch businessman Frans van Anraat sold huge quantities of the chemical thiodiglycol (TDG) to the regime of Saddam Hussein to serve as raw material for the production of mustard gas. As is well known, Saddam Hussein deployed mustard gas both in the war against Iran and during the massacre in the Kurdish village of Halabja. After having made sizable profits, van Anraat sought refuge in Iraq where he managed to stay clear of American justice. The US invasion of Iraq prompted him to return to his home country, where he stayed a couple of months in a safe house, apparently enjoying protection from the Dutch Intelligence Service which considered van Anraat a useful informer. To his unpleasant surprise, however, van Anraat was arrested in December 2004, on criminal charges of complicity in war crimes and genocide. Interestingly, the court concluded that the attacks on Kurdish villages had been committed with the specific intent to destroy (part of) the Kurdish population in Iraq -- which could be qualified as an ethnic group -- and hence constituted genocide. Van Anraat, however, while convicted of complicity in war crimes, was acquitted of the charge of complicity in genocide. According to the court, it could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew that, by supplying TDG to Saddam Hussein's regime, he was contributing to the genocidal campaign against the Kurds. The court thus strictly adhered to international legal standards which, in its opinion, required actual knowledge of the specific intent on part of the accomplice, rather than applying domestic criminal law which -- as the court admitted -- might have resulted in broader criminal responsibility.

Since 1993, German courts have dealt with many cases concerning international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, as, for most of them; the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Prosecutor did not request that German courts defer to the International Tribunal. Courts applied both the principle of universality (with regard to cases of genocide), enshrined in the German Criminal Code, and the doctrine of ‘legitimizing domestic links’ between the alleged crimes and Germany. In the majority of cases investigated in Germany (the Federal Attorney-General investigated approximately 131 cases of suspected genocide), the ICTY Prosecutor did not request a transfer to the ICTY, so that those cases remained with the national prosecution authorities. In particular, the courts held that Article VI of the Genocide Convention could not be interpreted in such a manner so as to prohibit prosecution in Germany. Considering the Convention's legislative history, it is unsustainable to conclude that only courts at the locus of perpetration or an international tribunal have jurisdiction. Moreover, Article I of the Convention obliges all Contracting States to prevent and punish crimes that are outlawed worldwide. As explicit reference to the universality principle is missing from the Convention, the Contracting States are not obliged to prosecute in these cases, but they are nevertheless entitled to do so. Article 9 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Statute eventually confirmed the Federal Supreme Court's interpretation of the Genocide Convention, setting out national courts' concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of genocide.

Examples of notable verdicts and sentences imposed in 2004 by the domestic courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina includes: The case of Ratko Gašović, who was found guilty of war crimes against civilians (in relation to rape, forced labour and inhumane treatment) and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment at the Sarajevo Cantonal Court on 9 February. The Supreme Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina reduced the sentence to eight years imprisonment on 6 October 2004. Also, there are some notable decisions pronounced by the domestic courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina convicting Ivan Baković, Vlastimir Pušara, Mario Matić, Dragan Bunoza, Zoran Knežević etc. for international crimes.

As the human rights movement began to focus upon the issue of impunity, génocidaires could no longer confidently expect that their crimes would go unpunished. On two occasions, the Security Council intervened to ensure prosecution by international tribunals established pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. In 2002, the Secretariat succeeded in negotiating the establishment of a third international tribunal, for Sierra Leone. Of the international efforts, both the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia can be described as an unqualified success with respect to prosecution of international crimes. The success of the two tribunals can be estimated by the fact that several of its convictions have been upheld by the Appeals Chamber. Alongside the flowering of international prosecutions for genocide, by the two ad hoc tribunals, national courts have also begun to take the matter more seriously. Far and away the most successful, from the standpoint of convictions, are the national courts of Rwanda. The systems of justice established by the ICTR and ICTY have given rise to an increase in prosecutions of criminals for international crimes in the state [domestic] courts of Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavian nations. Belgium has also taken action on the basis of universal jurisdiction in relation to offences in Rwanda.

In an amicus curiae brief to the US Supreme Court in 2004 the United Kingdom, Australia and Switzerland maintained that universal criminal jurisdiction exists over serious crimes such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The Torture Convention of 1984, ratified by 124 governments including the United States, requires states either to prosecute any suspected torturer found on their territory, regardless of where the torture took place, or to extradite the suspect to a country that will do so. Similarly, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the conduct of war, ratified by 189 countries including the United States, require each participating state to "search for" persons who have committed grave breaches of the conventions and to "bring such persons, regardless of nationality, before its own courts." What is new is not the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction but the willingness of some governments to fulfil this duty against those in high places. Furthermore, in recent years national courts have exercised universal jurisdiction against a wide range of suspects: Bosnian war criminals, Rwandan genocidaires, Argentine torturers, and Chad's former dictator. It has come to the point that the main limit on national courts empowered to exercise universal jurisdiction is the availability of the defendant within the jurisdiction of that particular national court.

Sometimes, the fact that the prosecuted act [allegedly] constitutes an international crime is merely mentioned by a prosecutor or a judge, without practical consequences for the outcome of the case. In Pius Nwaoga v. The State (1972), the Nigerian Supreme Court upheld a conviction for a murder during civil war and stated obiter that this killing amounted to a crime against humanity. Since 1994, Ethiopia has held large-scale trials for crimes against humanity and genocide allegedly committed during the Mengistu regime that ruled the country until 1991. Most of the offences that can constitute genocide or crimes against humanity have long been criminalized and prosecuted under domestic law, but as ordinary crimes and not in the qualified form of genocide and crimes against humanity.

The ICTY’s Appeals Chamber in the Tadic case, in connection with genocide, stated that “universal jurisdiction [is] nowadays acknowledged in the case of international crimes.” Similarly, the ICTR held in the case of Prosecutor v. Ntuyahaga that universal jurisdiction exists for the crime of genocide.

A number of international treaties, which address international (or transnational) crimes, oblige the State Parties to investigate and prosecute the offence in question, or to extradite suspects to another State Party willing to do so: the so-called aut dedere, aut judicare (‘to extradite or prosecute’) principle. Examples can be found in the four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, covering war crimes that constitute ‘grave breaches’ under these instruments. The principle also exists in the 1984 Torture Convention which is discussed in detail in the next part of the essay.

PART-II

TORTURE: EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:

Universal jurisdiction is the ability of the court of any state to try persons for crimes committed outside its territory which are not linked to the state by the nationality of the suspect or the victims or by harm to the state’s own national interests. Sometimes this rule is called permissive universal jurisdiction. My argument is that when a national court is exercising jurisdiction over conduct amounting to crimes under international law or ordinary crimes of international concern committed abroad, as opposed to conduct simply amounting to ordinary crimes, the court is really acting as an agent of the international community enforcing international law. Under the related aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) rule, a state may not shield a person suspected of certain categories of crimes such as torture as elaborated in Convention Against Torture . Instead, it is required either to exercise jurisdiction (which would necessarily include universal jurisdiction in certain cases) over a person suspected of certain categories of crimes or to extradite the person to a state able and willing to do so or to surrender the person to an international criminal court with jurisdiction over the suspect and the crime.

Article 5 of the 1984 UN Convention against Torture is frequently invoked as an example of a treaty provision setting up universal jurisdiction. Article 5 provides that, in addition to territorial nationality jurisdiction, nationality and, if appropriate, passive personality jurisdiction, ‘each state party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him’. It is often said that this grants universal jurisdiction over torture.

There can be no doubt that the Pinochet Case is a "landmark decision." It is a step in the direction of enforcing the law against torture and sends out a warning to all torturers and would be torturers that they have no safe haven anywhere from its enforcement. The principle established by the majority was that the Senator, as a former head of state, was not immune from the criminal process in respect of the offense of torture as of the signing of the 1984 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment on December 8, 1988 by all three countries (Chile, United Kingdom and Spain). However, under British law, the Senator was not liable to be extradited to Spain in respect of his conduct before September 29, 1988 when torture became a crime in the United Kingdom, because the double criminality rule was not satisfied in respect of that earlier period. The effect of the decision was to reduce the charges for which Senator Pinochet could be extradited from many thousands to a single substantive charge and an associated conspiracy charge. The principle of international law that was established is that former heads of state are not immune from criminal process for the international crime of torture. This principle was based by the majority of the Law Lords on the fact that the Party States had signed the Torture Convention and must therefore be taken to have agreed, from the time of signing, that immunity no longer applied in respect of the official acts of a former head of state that amounted to an international crime. Pinochet No. 3 established that a former head of state has no immunity for the international crime of torture.

The law governing immunity in the United Kingdom is section 20 of the State Immunity Act 1978, read with section 39(2) of Schedule 1 of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. The Appellate Committee held by a majority that, generally, a head of state had immunity under those provisions rationes personae (by virtue of his status as a head of state) and a former head of state rationes materiae (in respect of his official or governmental acts). However, by a majority, Pinochet No. 3 decided that a former head of state did not have immunity in respect of acts of torture or conspiracy to torture after 8 December 1988, the date by which Spain, Chile and the United Kingdom had ratified the Torture Convention, because they could not have intended that immunity for former heads of state survive their ratification. From the decision it follows that any official (or former official), irrespective of rank, is amenable to the jurisdiction of any national court for any act of torture. It is not required that the act be in pursuance of a policy to commit systematic or widespread torture. As already mentioned the United Kingdom, which did not incorporate the Torture Convention into its domestic law, claims jurisdiction over persons within its territory in respect of acts of torture anywhere in the world. One of the important aspect of the Pinochet Case, that the United Kingdom was under an obligation under Article 7 of the Torture Convention, if it did not extradite, to refer the case to its prosecuting authorities: aut dedere aut punire. The British Attorney General addressed this obligation at a very early stage, when Spain made its request. It was addressed again when the Secretary of State was at the point of deciding to bring an end to the extradition process. On both occasions, the Crown Prosecution Service determined not to launch a domestic prosecution on the ground that there was no evidence against him. On March 2, the day on which the Secretary of State made his decision not to order the Senator's surrender to Spain or any other requesting state, the Solicitor General speaking for the Crown Prosecution Service confirmed the Attorney-General's view that there was "insufficient admissible evidence" to justify Pinochet's prosecution in England and that there was "no reasonable prospect" of his conviction of "any criminal offense."

The International Law Commission, which has incorporated the aut dedere aut judicare rule in the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996 Draft Code of Crimes) has explained the principle and its rationale as follows: “The obligation to prosecute or extradite is imposed on the custodial State in whose territory an alleged offender is present. The custodial State has an obligation to take action to ensure that such an individual is prosecuted either by the national authorities of that State or by another State which indicates that it is willing to prosecute the case by requesting extradition. The custodial State is in a unique position to ensure the implementation of the present Code by virtue of the presence of the alleged offender in its territory. Therefore the custodial State has an obligation to take the necessary and reasonable steps to apprehend an alleged offender and to ensure the prosecution and trial of such an individual by a competent jurisdiction. The obligation to extradite or prosecute applies to a State which has custody of ‘an individual alleged to have committed a crime.’ This phrase is used to refer to a person who is singled out, not on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, but on the basis of pertinent factual information.”

The International Law Commission noted that the duty either to prosecute or extradite would depend on the sufficiency of the evidence.

In the case of torture, the ICTY stated that ‘the requirement that states expeditiously institute national implementing measures is an integral part of the international obligation to prohibit [torture]’ and therefore ‘states must immediately set in motion all those procedures and measures that may make it possible, within their municipal legal system, to forestall any act of torture or expeditiously put an end to any torture that is occurring’.

It also added that ‘[t]he mere fact of keeping in force or passing legislation contrary to the international prohibition of torture generates international state responsibility’.

In a judgment rendered in 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia declared that international criminal liability is not exhausted by those crimes [genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes], but also includes violations of the so-called ‘peremptory’ norms of international law (jus cogens). According to the Tribunal, ‘in human rights law the violation of rights which have reached the level of jus cogens, such as torture, may constitute international crimes’. By virtue of the 1984 United Nation Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment , torture is a treaty crime, subject – for the states parties to the Convention – to an ‘extradite or prosecute’ obligation. At the same time, torture is also an international crime. When perpetrated as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population, torture is an international crime for the additional reason that it is a crime against humanity . And when perpetrated in the context of armed conflict, it may also be a war crime, and hence an international crime on that account as well. The above reasoning is based on the assumption that the prohibition of torture ‘has evolved into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even “ordinary” customary rules’. A strong case can be made that the conclusions of the ICTY with regard to the crime of torture would also apply to other jus cogens provisions contained in the Rome Statute, such as that criminalizing genocide [and other international crimes]. The obligation to ensure that crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court are also crimes under national law and that domestic principles of criminal responsibility are consistent with those contained in the Rome Statute must be considered as implicit, because the jurisdiction of the Court is based on the principle of complementarity.

PART-III

IMMUNITY, AMNESTY AND STATUTORY LIMITATION:

Universal jurisdiction has been infrequently relied upon in national judicial decisions. But, its relationship with other international legal instruments issues is a matter of debate. Among them, for example, is the question of whether heads of state and diplomats can invoke immunity as a bar to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. With respect to certain international crimes, the substantive defence of immunity has been eliminated since the Nuremberg Charter and the judgments of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT). Such removal of substantive immunity means that a defendant cannot rely on his or her status as a head of state or diplomat to interpose as a substantive defence resulting in exoneration from criminal responsibility for these crimes. However, so far, there is no treaty or customary law practice that removes the temporal immunity of heads of state or diplomats while they are in office, with the exception of the indictment of Slobodan Milosevic by the ICTY while he was head of state.

The judgment the Audiencia Nacional (AN) delivered in Scilingo on 19 April 2005 has put an end to the impunity the former Argentinean officer, Adolfo Francisco Scilingo, who had committed serious crimes under the military dictatorship (1976-1983), enjoyed for almost 30 years. This is also, after Eichmann, the first case of extraterritorial application, by national courts, of the international rules on crimes against humanity.

A wide portion of the complaints filed by civil petitioners in Belgium targeted former leaders or incumbent heads of state or government. The issue of such individuals' immunity was therefore raised. In its 14 February 2002 decision, the ICJ reaffirmed the principle of absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction granted to incumbent foreign leaders, regardless of the nature of the alleged crime, and subject to the lifting of such immunity and prosecution before an international court. According to the Court, there is no exception under customary international law to the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability of incumbent leaders, even when they have allegedly committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. It follows that, in the opinion of the Court, foreign ministers (and other state officials), after leaving office, may be prosecuted and punished for international crimes perpetrated while in office only if such crimes are regarded as acts committed in their ‘private capacity’, a conclusion that is hardly consistent with the current pattern of international criminality and surely does not meet the demands of international criminal justice. On 12 February 2003, the Court of Cassation applied this rule by invalidating proceedings against the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon. When official capacity has ceased to exist, the ICJ deems that the former leader can be prosecuted for acts committed before or after the period he held such official capacity, and for acts committed during this period but in a private capacity. Admittedly, the immunity of leaders and practising diplomats does not only involve relations between judicial authorities and the actors of criminal proceedings, but also inter-state relations themselves: refusing to grant them any immunity whatsoever could have repercussions for the individual, as well as the functioning and representation of the state or organization in question. Judicial and diplomatic imperatives are at loggerheads over this point.

The stance adopted by the ICJ on 14 February 2002 bears direct incidence on the jurisdiction of the ICC. Such jurisdiction would no longer be complementary, but rather exclusive, regarding individuals who could oppose their immunity to prosecutions undertaken by national courts. In this case, national courts find themselves in the legal inability to carry out prosecutions within the meaning of Article 17(1) (a) of the Rome Statute. Hence, only the international court will be able to try individuals having an official capacity which shields them from national prosecution.

The indictment and arrest by Senegal of Chad's ex-President Hissein Habrc and similar efforts in Cambodia, Sierra Leone, Togo, and East Timor, persons who have committed international crimes, other than current heads of state or accredited diplomats, are no longer generally seen as safe from prosecution either in their home countries, with or without immunity, or during travels to other countries. Indeed, these developments may reflect the entry of a new era in which domestic prosecutions for international crimes will flourish. Through these advances governments have become accustomed to the idea that international criminal law constitutes a real and operative body of law, which in turn has facilitated domestic prosecutions of persons accused of these crimes. The entry into force of the ICC Statute will only accelerate and strengthen this movement, for it not only establishes an international court, but also legitimates and even gives priority to national prosecutions.

The term "amnesty" derives from the Greek word "amnestia" – meaning "forgetfulness" or oblivion. An act of government by which certain past offences are obliterated from legal remembrance. In the present context, amnesty refers to an act of sovereign power immunizing persons from criminal prosecution for past offenses. There is no provision regarding amnesty in Rome Statute of International Criminal Court. The ICC will have to face the problem of amnesty because a State may grant amnesty for peace. And if the persons to whom amnesty is granted are prosecuted before ICC, conviction may be certain. Article 27 of the Rome Statute recognizes the irrelevance of official capacity as far as responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court is concerned. Many States such as Chile. Argentina, France, Zimbabwe, India, Pakistan, Spain and South Africa have determined to put behind them their tragic past and dissipate internal strife by granting amnesty to offenders on both sides of the political divide. To the victims of human rights crimes, amnesty represents the ultimate in hypocrisy: while victims struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are allowed to enjoy a comfortable retirement. When the South African amnesty scheme was challenged on the grounds that it violated the rights of families to seek judicial redress for the murders of their loved ones [international crimes], the newly-created Constitutional Court rejected the claim on the ground that neither the South African Constitution nor any applicable treaty prevented granting amnesty in exchange for truth.

Most domestic systems know statutory limitations, or prescription. But while civil law jurisdictions provide for a general application, most common law jurisdictions exclude murder and other very serious offences. Statutory limitations aim to prevent unjust delays between the commission of the offence and prosecution (or punishment), but could, if applicable, lead to impunity for the most heinous international crimes. Statutes of limitations at times are obstacles in national prosecutions.

PART-IV

CONCLUSION :

By way of a conclusion it can be said that no one expects the ICC, on its own, to deter all crimes. The ICC must be part of a framework of measures to sustain a culture of accountability, including increased domestic prosecution of such crimes, greater use of universal jurisdiction, and greater international cooperation in suppressing international crimes. National courts are not about to become uniformly capable or willing to bring justice for atrocities in the immediate future. This is particularly true in post-conflict situations where justice systems have been either partially or completely destroyed. As a result, international justice will remain a crucial last resort that must continue to be fortified against efforts to undermine it.

The State party to the Rome Statute of International Criminal Court recalls in the Preamble that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.” As laid down in the Preamble of the statute, its States parties are determined to put an end to impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes which are of concern to the international community as a whole. The ICC is intended to provide for punishment where a domestic prosecution fails. This is a rather far-reaching aim that seems to cover any case of criminal impunity including amnesties.

The Preamble to the Rome Statute, as well as Articles 1 and 17 of the same, specifically dictate that the ICC jurisdiction be complementary to that of the States party to the Statute. This language indicates that the framers of the Rome Statute meant for the ICC to only pursue cases if the national system is unwilling or unable to do so. The principle of complementarity, as expressed in the preceding sentence, is extremely integral to the procedures of the court. In fact, the Prosecutor’s office has been dedicated to the overarching values of state sovereignty since the Court’s inception in 2003:

“States Parties will necessarily continue to play an active role so that the Court can enhance the wide support that it enjoys today and achieve universal participation…. The Court is complementary to national systems. This means that whenever there is genuine State action, the Court cannot and will not intervene. As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure [to count] its efficiency. On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court [International Criminal Court], as a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.”

Preambular paragraph 5 then goes on to clarify that the object of effective prosecution is intended to fulfil the ultimate purpose to ‘put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes’ . Interpreted in the light of this object and purpose, the assertion that ‘the International Criminal Court […] shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions’ denotes a system of international criminal law enforcement that allocates the primary responsibility to national criminal jurisdictions. In such a system, the object of prosecuting with the necessary deterrent effect for the ultimate purpose of putting an end to impunity and preventing the commission of crimes in the future, would be undermined if States decided not to implement so as to fully criminalize conduct punishable under the Statute. For enforcement of international criminal law as envisaged by the Rome Statute would lack its principal pillar, namely ‘measures at the national level’.

With growing frequency, national courts operating under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction are prosecuting despots in their custody for atrocities committed abroad. Impunity may still be the norm in many domestic courts, but international justice is an increasingly viable option, promising a measure of solace to victims and their families and raising the possibility that would-be tyrants will begin to think twice before embarking on a barbarous path. From the above discussion it is clear that domestic efforts to prosecute international crimes are inferior to those undertaken by international (and internationalised) courts. Now with the efficient functioning of the ICC and effective implementation of the ICC Statute by the member states domestic prosecutions will increase and it would demonstrate the efficacy of the ICC. The less the ICC is prosecuting the better it is functioning because the jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to domestic courts.

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Adv.Abhaykumar Dilip Ostwal
Advocate, Supreme Court of India
B.S.L. LL.B. LL.M. (University of Birmingham, UK), C.C.F.&M.J. (Gold Medallist), D.I.T.

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